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█ Abstract I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argu-
ment that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties can-
not be reduced to another kind of property (e.g., perceptual or cognitive). I disagree, however, with 
Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of de-
ciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of 
trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component of the experi-
ences of trying and acting is not, as Kriegel suggests, best characterized in terms of commitment to the 
rightness or goodness of the objects of experience. Rather, I argue that the attitudinal component is best 
characterized in imperatival terms. 
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█ Riassunto Kriegel e la fenomenologia dell’azione – In questo testo mi concentrerò sulla descrizione della 
fenomenologia conativa di Kriegel. Mentre condivido la tesi di Kriegel, secondo cui parte della fenomeno-
logia conativa è primitiva, nel senso che parte delle proprietà fenomeniche conative non possono essere 
ridotte ad altri tipi di proprietà (per esempio, percettive o cognitive), debbo tuttavia dissentire riguardo la 
specifica caratterizzazione data da Kriegel delle proprietà in questione. Kriegel ritiene che l’esperienza del 
decidere-e-poi-sforzarsi sia il nucleo della fenomenologia conativa. Io direi tuttavia che le esperienze dello 
sforzo e dell’azione occupano meglio questa posizione. Inoltre, suggerirei che la componente relativa 
all’atteggiamento delle esperienze dello sforzo e dell’azione non sia descrivibile al meglio, come suggerisce 
Kriegel, in termini di impegno legato all’adeguatezza o all’integrità dell’oggetto d’esperienza. Direi piutto-
sto che la componente dell’atteggiamento sia meglio descrivibile in termini imperativi. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Fenomenologia dell’agentività; Atto della decisione; Atto dello sforzo; Imperativi 
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█  Introduction: Kriegel’s project 
 
IN A NUMBER OF RECENT papers, and most 
centrally in his book The Varieties of Con-
sciousness,1 Uriah Kriegel attempts to map out 
the nature and structure of conscious experi-
ence. In my opinion, his is one of the most ex-
citing projects in the philosophy of mind. Its 
importance – which I associate with the inter-
est attached to the questions Kriegel is asking, 
and the insights he is developing in response – 
is bolstered by Kriegel’s ability to move seam-
lessly between important historical sources 
located in the so-called continental traditions 
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of (primarily) Continental Europe, and im-
portant contemporary sources located in the 
so-called analytic tradition of (primarily) the 
English-speaking nations. 
The project involves an attempt to chart a 
kind of map of the phenomenal realm, guided 
by a concern to understand the identity and na-
ture of the types of what Kriegel calls primitive 
phenomenology. For Kriegel, a type of phe-
nomenology is primitive if it is best placed 
within the second layer of a broader structure 
of determinable-determinate relations. He is 
looking for second-layer determinables because 
the first layer is characterized very abstractly: 
 
The highest phenomenal determinable is 
phenomenality per se (what-it-is-like-ness 
as such, if you will). It is the phenomenal 
property that is not a determinate of any 
other phenomenal property.2 
 
Ultimately, at the second layer Kriegel 
finds at least six primitive types of phenome-
nology. Perceptual and algedonic phenome-
nology are accepted as primitive more or less 
without argument. Argument is given for the 
existence of cognitive, entertaining, conative, 
and imaginative phenomenology. Kriegel 
admits there may be others, and his willing-
ness to consider a range of potential candi-
dates at places in the book lends his discus-
sion considerable interest. The whole thing is 
worth reading. In what follows, however, I 
restrict my attention primarily to Kriegel’s 
arguments on behalf of conative phenome-
nology – that is, the phenomenology associ-
ated with motivation and action. 
Kriegel presents his account of conative 
phenomenology in chapter 2 of The Varieties 
of Consciousness. Two claims are critical, and 
form the core of the account. First, Kriegel 
argues that some conative phenomenology is 
primitive in that some conative phenomenal 
properties cannot be reduced to another kind 
of property (e.g., perceptual or cognitive). 
Second, Kriegel argues for a specific charac-
terization of the properties in question:  
the fundamental form of our conative ex-
perience is a proprietary phenomenology 
of deciding-and-then-trying.3  
 
In what follows, I first elucidate Kriegel’s 
arguments for both claims. Next, I assess the 
arguments. I agree with Kriegel’s irreducibil-
ity claim. But I question his characterization 
of the core properties of conative phenome-
nology. This disagreement may run deep. For 
the reasons I offer suggest a separate way to 
draw the boundaries around conative phenom-
enology. On this way, the phenomenology of 
trying and acting may be distinct from conative 
phenomenology more broadly, with ramifica-
tions for how we think of the nature and scope 
of the primitive kinds of phenomenology 
Kriegel identifies. 
 
█  Kriegel’s conative phenomenology 
 
For Kriegel, conative phenomenology in-
volves phenomenal properties associated with 
motivation and action. These are properties 
attached to states and processes described as 
desiring to A, wishing that P, valuing or dis-
valuing X, preferring X to Y, intending to A, 
planning to A, deciding to A, trying to A, doing 
A, and so on. Kriegel endorses primitivism 
about conative phenomenology – the claim 
that «some phenomenal property is (i) instanti-
ated by some unquestionably conative state, (ii) 
not instantiated by any nonconative states, and 
(iii) irreducible to any (combination of) other 
phenomenal properties».4  
Kriegel argues primarily by elimination: 
he considers and rejects a number of (more 
or less) plausible proposals for eliminating or 
reducing conative phenomenology. I am 
convinced: for purposes of exposition, I con-
sider the last two proposals, which are in my 
view the most plausible. 
The first proposal I will consider has it 
that the phenomenology of doing something 
with one’s body – e.g., clenching one’s fist – 
can be reduced to three things: 
 
(i) tactile phenomenology of one’s hand’s 
various parts touching each other, (ii) vis-
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ual (or for that matter cognitive) phe-
nomenology of seeing (or judging) that 
one caused the fist to clench, and (iii) 
proprioceptive phenomenology of feeling 
one’s fist muscles contracting.5 
 
Kriegel’s primary problem with this pro-
posal is that it gets the timing of the phenom-
enology wrong. We do not experience the 
phenomenology of doing something after it is 
done, as this account entails. Rather, «the 
phenomenology of doing the contracting of 
one’s muscles takes place during, or rather 
leading up to, the muscle contraction».6 
The last proposal Kriegel considers is due 
to William James. The Jamesian proposal 
appeals not to tactile or proprioceptive feed-
back, but to anticipative tactile or proprio-
ceptive imagery. As Kriegel notes, «on this 
view, the key element for capturing the cona-
tive dimension of the experience of clenching 
one’s fist is the feel of imaginatively antici-
pating one’s fist muscles contracting».7  
Against this proposal, Kriegel makes two 
points. First, it again gets the timing of the 
phenomenology wrong, placing it before the 
doing takes place. Second, it «seems false to 
our experience». Kriegel elaborates: 
 
We experience a representation of the act 
to follow, but also of the act following, 
and following because we make it follow. 
That is, we experience not only an antici-
pation of the act, but also the causing of 
the act in real time.8 
 
I agree with Kriegel against James that 
there is an irreducibly agentive or actional 
element to the phenomenology. Elsewhere, I 
have argued that there is no good empirical 
reason to identify this aspect of phenome-
nology with anticipative imagery, and fur-
thermore that there is some reason to think 
that this aspect is at least partially constitut-
ed by executive states such as intentions and 
command signals.9 The difficult part is get-
ting the description of this aspect of the phe-
nomenology right. For without a compelling 
account of the nature of the phenomenology 
at issue, skeptics will likely find space to dis-
sent.  
I turn, then, to Kriegel’s characterization 
of the core properties of conative phenome-
nology. The first aspect of this characterization 
has to do with the nature of conative attitudes. 
 
What seems to characterize conative states 
is their value-commitment. To want ice 
cream, to wish for ice cream, to like ice 
cream, to approve of ice cream – all these 
commit to the goodness of ice cream. The 
notion of goodness at play here is maximally 
neutral – a kind of completely generic 
goodness. It covers both moral and other 
kinds of goodness (e.g., aesthetic). It covers 
relative goodness (“good for”) and absolute 
goodness (good tout court). It covers the 
goodness of states of affairs, but also the 
goodness of actions (“rightness”), mental 
states (“fittingness”), and persons (“virtue”). 
It covers intrinsic and final goodness, as well 
as instrumental goodness. We may call this 
generic goodness, or goodness-G for short. 
Positive conative states (such as liking or 
approving of something) are characterized 
by their goodness-G-commitment; negative 
ones (disliking, disapproving) by their bad-
ness-G-commitment.10 
 
Kriegel distinguishes the way that cona-
tive attitudes commit to goodness from two 
other ways of committing to goodness. The 
first is a belief’s representing-as-true p’s be-
ing good. The second is a sensory state’s (e.g., 
a pain’s) sensuous representing-as-good p. 
Conative attitudes are nonsensuous, and thus 
they represent-as-good in a nonsensuous 
way. Kriegel comments:  
 
If nonsensuous representing-as-good-G is 
the mark of the conative, then all conscious 
conative states exhibit what we may call 
nonsensuous presenting-as-good-G.11 
 
The second aspect of Kriegel’s characteri-
zation involves the identification of the most 
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fundamental conative states and processes. 
Here Kriegel draws on the work of Paul Ric-
oeur, arguing that the core of conative phe-
nomenology is that of deciding-and-then-
trying. 
Kriegel first considers the experience of 
deciding, as explicated by Ricoeur.12 The 
phenomenology of deciding is marked by 
several features. First, decisions are directed 
to projects represented as in the future. They 
thereby have a «character of futurity»; se-
cond, deciding «presents the project as in my 
power»; third, deciding involves a felt pull to 
action: «unless a mental state involves a pull 
to action, it is not a decision».13 As Ricoeur 
has it, in deciding «I feel myself somehow 
charged, in the way a battery is charged: I 
have the power to act».14 Further, this pull to 
action is categorical, distinguishing deciding 
from related states such as desire.  
Kriegel claims that the categorical nature 
of deciding is an attitudinal feature – deci-
sions are characterized by an attitude of 
commitment to the project or plan that is the 
decision’s content. How does the specific na-
ture of deciding relate to the general mark of 
the conative – to what Kriegel calls present-
ing-as-good-G? Kriegel claims that «deci-
sion’s categorical pull-to-action feel casts de-
cision as directed at the right».15 This is be-
cause, for Kriegel, rightness is an attribute of 
actions, and goodness of states of affairs. 
And decisions are always about actions. So 
decisions present-as-right the actions they 
are about. 
According to Kriegel, however, the expe-
rience of deciding is incomplete on its own. It 
requires a complement. 
 
Deciding feels impatient: its pull to action 
is unnerving, strongly calling me to act it 
out. Not only does the decision dispose 
me to act, but until the decision is acted 
upon – until the disposition is manifested 
– there is a subtly unpleasant feeling of 
tension in my consciousness. Thus, by its 
very nature, a decision desperately wants 
to be realized – realized in action. Phe-
nomenologically, the exercise of the will is 
not exhausted when a decision has been 
formed – only when the process of realiz-
ing the decision is underway.16 
 
Although Kriegel writes in the above pas-
sage that a decision wants to be realized in 
action, he argues that the essential comple-
ment of the experience of deciding is an ex-
perience of trying. Kriegel is aware that this 
may seem unnatural. Why think of trying ra-
ther than acting as decision’s complement? 
Kriegel’s reasoning on this point is as fol-
lows. We are attempting to characterize 
some aspect of phenomenology, and phe-
nomenology is «an entirely mental phenom-
enon».17 Action, however, is not entirely 
mental. At least in the case of bodily actions, 
it is constituted in part by bodily movements. 
Bodily movements on their own lack inten-
tionality, as they fail Chisholm’s test for in-
tentionality. That is, action verbs that in-
volve the body support existential generaliza-
tion and do not evince substitution failure. 
 
From “Anatole moved his hand” […] one 
can validly infer “there is something that 
Anatole moved”; so existential generaliza-
tion is supported rather than failed. Further, 
from “Anatole moved his hand” […] in con-
junction with “Simone’s favorite object is 
Anatole’s hand” […] one can validly infer 
“Anatole moved Simone’s favorite object”; 
so there is no substitution failure either.18 
 
Kriegel favors trying over action as the 
complement of deciding because trying is, 
Kriegel avers, entirely mental. Trying passes 
Chisholm’s test for intentionality. As such, 
trying is «the mental “core” of action».19  
As for the phenomenology of trying, 
Kriegel makes three observations. First, like 
deciding, trying aims at the right: trying rep-
resents-as-right the object of the trying. Se-
cond, the experience of trying essentially in-
volves an experience of effort: «trying in-
volves the experience of mobilizing force in 
the face of resistance».20 Third, the experi-
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ence of trying in some sense satisfies the ten-
sion inherent in the experience of deciding. 
This allows Kriegel to bring together decid-
ing and trying as the joint core of conative 
phenomenology, as follows: 
 
[T]he feel of deciding to φ inherently re-
quires a complement in trying. This 
marks a deep difference between decision 
and desire. Since desire’s pull-to-action 
feel is merely hypothetical, there is noth-
ing phenomenologically problematic 
about desiring something but trying to do 
nothing about it. Things are different 
with decision: given decision’s categorical 
pull-to-action feel, it is strictly impossible 
that one should decide to φ without trying 
to φ. In that respect, the experiences of de-
ciding and trying are, au fond, two compo-
nents of a single experience, which for want 
of a better term I will call the “phenomenol-
ogy of deciding-cum-trying”.21 
 
So concludes my brief elucidation of 
Kriegel’s account of the core of conative 
phenomenology.22 There is much to like 
about this account, and many features of it 
that I am happy to accept. In what follows, 
however, I focus on areas of disagreement. A 
different view of the terrain Kriegel has cov-
ered is available. My aim is to shed some light 
on it so that we may compare alternatives 
and, if things go well for us, to sharpen our 
understanding of the terrain. 
 
█  Assessing the characterization of cona-
tive phenomenology’s core 
 
Recall that Kriegel’s account has two as-
pects. The first has to do with the nature of 
conative attitudes. The second has to do with 
a characterization of the core conative states 
and processes. I discuss these aspects in re-
verse order, beginning with the phenomenol-
ogy of deciding. 
I agree with some features of Kriegel’s 
Ricoeurian account. Conscious deciding has 
a character of futurity. Conscious deciding 
involves a felt pull-to-action. (Although I 
might emphasize that there is an active as-
pect to this “felt pull”, perhaps better de-
scribed as a felt charge to act.) Conscious de-
ciding is categorical in nature. But I am not 
convinced that conscious deciding requires a 
complement. 
Here is why I am not convinced. Action 
theorists distinguish between distal inten-
tions and proximal intentions. These are in-
tentions to A at some point in the future, and 
intentions to A now, respectively. According-
ly, we can distinguish distal from proximal 
decisions. Distal decisions are intentional 
mental actions of distal intention formation; 
proximal intentions are intentional mental 
actions of proximal intention formation. If 
any conscious decisions require a complement, 
it is conscious proximal decisions. But – here is 
a crucial claim in my reasoning – the phenom-
enology of distal and proximal deciding is the 
same qua deciding (that is, as regards intention 
formation). Since distal decisions do not re-
quire a complement, then we cannot draw the 
claim about complement requirement from the 
phenomenology of deciding. 
In my view, the core of the phenomenolo-
gy of deciding can be described as that of 
performing the mental action of assenting or 
committing to a plan.23 How best to under-
stand the causal processes that undergird the 
phenomenology is a difficult issue.24 But as 
for the phenomenology, it seems to me that 
the mental action of assenting or committing 
is not irreducible. It involves trying – the 
mobilizing of effort as Kriegel puts it – and it 
typically is successful. So the phenomenology 
of deciding is just the phenomenology of try-
ing to do or of doing a certain thing, namely, 
deciding. 
If this is right, then the core of the phe-
nomenology in question will be reduced to 
trying, or acting. Certainly Kriegel will opt 
for trying, for reasons we have seen. But I am 
not convinced we should dispatch with the 
phenomenology of acting. As Kriegel recog-
nizes, the view that trying is the mental core 
of action is open to the following objection. 
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Normally, we do not experience ourselves as 
trying, but as acting. Indeed, Kriegel attrib-
utes to Ricoeur the very plausible observa-
tion that  
 
in our actual experience it is action that 
manifests itself to us first and foremost, 
while trying is relatively obscured and re-
quires careful and somewhat tutored at-
tention.25  
 
In response, Kriegel makes two points. 
The second is an argument that trying, not 
acting, is the natural complement of decid-
ing. Since I have argued that deciding needs 
no complement, and is reducible anyway to 
trying or acting, I leave this point aside.  
The point on which I focus involves an 
analogy with perception. Kriegel notes that 
we experience ourselves as seeing the world, 
even though nothing in the experience guar-
antees success: «our experience is in fact a 
state which might be either a seeing or a hal-
lucinating».26 Similarly, Kriegel notes, for 
experiences of trying and acting. 
 
When it is successful, our experience of our-
selves as acting is veridical, and when it is 
unsuccessful, nonveridical. It remains that 
nothing in the conative experience itself 
guarantees its success, just as nothing in a 
visual experience guarantees its veridicality. 
So the experience itself is just a trying.27 
 
I fail to see how the lack of a guarantee of 
success renders the experience itself just a try-
ing. Perhaps Kriegel is thinking that in the ab-
sence of a guarantee, trying is all we can know 
that we have done. But again, I fail to see how a 
lack of knowledge about the experience’s verid-
icality makes the experience a trying. 
Here is one way to think about the mental 
core of action. Either the common experience 
attached with acting is an experience of trying 
or one of acting. Consider Ricoeur’s example of 
the clenching of a fist. When I consciously and 
successfully clench the fist, there are different 
aspects to my phenomenology. I experience di-
recting activity (or mobilizing effort) towards 
the clenching, and I experience certain things 
attached to the fist actually clenching. I think it 
is an open question whether what I experience 
is best described as a decomposable sum of the 
experience of trying along with perceptual ele-
ments related to the fist actually clenching, or 
instead best described as a non-decomposable 
unity of the experience of acting – of my 
clenching the fist. On either description, the 
total experience involves perceptual elements.  
On the former description, we can phe-
nomenologically separate the trying from the 
clenching. Thus, even in veridical cases, it 
seems appropriate to describe the agentive core 
(if not the mental core) of the action as an ex-
perience of trying.28 On the latter, it seems in-
appropriate to do so – the trying and the 
clenching are unified. I do not consciously try 
to clench the fist. I consciously clench it. On 
this description, then, the experience of acting 
has as much claim to the title “mental core of 
action” as does the experience of trying. We 
might, then, have to make room for both. 
I turn to a different aspect of Kriegel’s ac-
count of conative phenomenology – his 
characterization of the conative attitudes. I 
accept that the phenomenology attached 
with desiring, wishing, hoping, valuing, and 
preferring commits to the goodness of its ob-
jects in the way Kriegel describes. But I am 
not convinced that the phenomenology at-
tached with trying and acting does so – at 
least not essentially. Rather than positing 
conative attitudes as essential to these kinds 
of experiences, we might posit something 
akin to imperatival attitudes. Imperatives is-
sue commands.  
Drawing on Kriegel’s way of explicating 
attitudes, imperatival attitudes do not repre-
sent-as-good (or represent-as-right) their ob-
jects. Instead, they represent-as-to-be-done 
their objects. The difference here is, in part, 
that imperatival attitudes contain no value 
commitment. They are concerned only to 
command (clusters of) action(s). 
I think this imperatival proposal can cap-
ture the phenomenology of intending (and 
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thereby a part of the phenomenology of de-
ciding, namely, the part associated with the 
pull-to-action and the charge-to-act men-
tioned above). Recall Kriegel’s claim:  
 
If nonsensuous representing-as-good-G is 
the mark of the conative, then all conscious 
conative states exhibit what we may call 
nonsensuous presenting-as-good-G.29 
 
Conscious conative states nonsensuously 
present-as-good their objects. As I have said, I 
do not disagree that this is accurate as applied 
to desiring, preferring, and so on. But in the 
case of intending, I think we confront a subtly 
distinct type of phenomenology, characterized 
by a nonsensuous imperatival attitude.30 Con-
scious intentions nonsensuously present-as-to-
be-done their objects. 
Something else is needed, however, if we 
wish to capture trying and acting. This is be-
cause in trying and acting, an agent does not 
experience her attempts or actions as to-be-
done – she experiences them as what she is 
doing. In consciously acting, the agent expe-
riences herself at once fulfilling the command 
she herself generates and maintains.31 
It is better to say, then, that the attitude 
that characterizes the phenomenology of try-
ing and acting is a proprietarily executional 
attitude. When consciously trying or acting, 
the agent experiences herself as executing the 
plan that is her goal: she has an experience of 
directing activity towards goal-fulfillment. 
This kind of experience makes no comment 
on the goodness or rightness of the thing done 
– the experience is only concerned with the 
doing and with what is being done. 
Note how little accepting this proposal 
would change what Kriegel says about the 
phenomenology at issue. I have not chal-
lenged anything Kriegel says about the phe-
nomenology of deciding; I have argued only 
that it can be explained in terms of trying or 
acting. Nor have I challenged much of what 
Kriegel says about trying. Trying is closely 
connected to the mobilization of effort, as 
Kriegel notes. I would resist, however, Kriegel’s 
claim that «given decision’s categorical pull-to-
action feel, it is strictly impossible that one 
should decide to φ without trying to φ». As 
applied to proximal decisions, I think it is 
very rare for an agent to decide to φ now 
without trying to φ. But I view these as logical-
ly distinct experience-types, and thus as sepa-
rable in principle. It is not inconceivable, in my 
view, that an agent could have the experience 
of deciding to φ and then, before a trying to φ 
or a φ-ing can begin, change her mind. Some-
times evidence for or against a decision contin-
ues to accumulate (via sub-personal assessment 
mechanisms) after a decision is made, leading 
to rapid changes of mind.32 
Even so, my proposal regarding the nature 
of the attitudes at issue in intending, trying 
and acting does suggest a disagreement with 
Kriegel regarding the structure of what 
Kriegel calls second-layer phenomenal primi-
tives – that is, the kinds of phenomenology 
that share what-it-is-like-ness and nothing 
else. If my proposal is right, then what 
Kriegel identifies as the core of conative 
phenomenology might be better thought of 
as the core of a different kind of primitive 
phenomenology – agentive phenomenology. 
This is not to say that conative (or moti-
vational) phenomenology is non-existent. A 
primitive conative phenomenology might 
still be associated with experiences that are, 
as Kriegel notes, fundamentally committed 
to the value of their objects. Experiences as-
sociated with desires, wishes, hopes, and 
preferences seem to be paradigm examples. 
But we might go further than this. In his 
chapter on emotional phenomenology Kriegel 
discusses a proposal due to Brentano that 
lumps together conative and emotional phe-
nomenology insofar as «both frame their ob-
ject as good».33 Kriegel notes that if we accept 
this proposal, «It would then be natural to hold 
that experiences exhibiting presenting-as-good 
form a second-layer phenomenal category on a 
par with experiences exhibiting presenting-as-
true and experiences exhibiting mere-present-
ing».34 Emotional and conative phenomenolo-
gy would turn out to be different classes of the 
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same second-layer phenomenology – what we 
might call evaluative phenomenology. 
One might go even further than this, ar-
guing that algedonic phenomenology – the 
phenomenology attached with pleasure and 
pain – constitutes a third kind of evaluative 
phenomenology. Certainly it is not implausi-
ble to think that the valenced aspects associ-
ated with pain and pleasure can be explained 
via attitudes that sensuously present-as-
valenced their objects. Against the backdrop 
of Kriegel’s bigger project, the possibility 
seems worth considering. 
I cannot defend these possibilities at 
length here, but it is worth noting that on this 
proposal, we have an explanation for the 
sense in which emotional, conative and 
algedonic states motivate action and feature 
in deliberation. In virtue of the fact that the-
se experiences frame their objects as good or 
bad in various ways, these states are capable 
of informing value-based action and deci-
sion. When it comes to the proprietarily 
agentive experiences of trying and acting, 
however, something different is going on. 
The experiences of trying and acting do not 
directly commit to the goodness or rightness 
of their objects. Rather, these experiences are 
concerned only with execution. That our try-
ings and actings can be rationalized by evalu-
ative states and experiences requires an addi-
tional layer of mentality – one not found in 
the tryings and actings themselves. 
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